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ABSTRACT
Overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. Thus, on the margin, they
undertake mergers that destroy value. They also perceive outside finance to be over-priced. We
classify CEOs as overconfident when, despite their under-diversification, they hold options on
company  stock  until  expiration.  We  find  that  these  CEOs  are  more  acquisitive  on  average,
particularly via diversifying deals. The effects are largest in firms with abundant cash and untapped
debt capacity. Using press coverage as "confident" or "optimistic" to measure overconfidence
confirms these results. We also find that the market reacts significantly more negatively to takeover
bids by overconfident managers.
Ulrike Malmendier










tate@wharton.upenn.edu“Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood
years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s
body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their man-
agerial kiss will do wonders for the proﬁtability of Company T[arget]...We’ve ob-
served many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses
remain serenely conﬁdent about the future potency of their kisses-even after their
corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.”
-Warren Buﬀet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report, 19811
Mergers and acquisitions a r ea m o n gt h em o s ts i g n i ﬁcant and disruptive activities undertaken
by large corporations. The staggering economic magnitude of these deals has inspired a myriad
of research on their causes and consequences. Most theories focus on the eﬃciency gains that
motivate takeover activity, often for speciﬁce p o c h s .T h ee m p i r i c a lr e s u l t so nr e t u r n st om e r g -
ers, however, are mixed, suggesting that mergers may not create value on average.2 Moreover,
even if there are gains from mergers, they do not appear to accrue to the shareholders of the
acquiring company. There is a signiﬁcant positive gain in target value upon the announcement
of a bid, and a signiﬁcant loss to the acquiror.3 These ﬁndings suggest that mergers are often
not in the interest of the shareholders of the acquiring company.
In this paper, we argue that overconﬁdence among acquiring CEOs is an important explana-
tion of merger activity. We develop a model of CEO overconﬁdence that shows the impact
of overconﬁdence on merger decisions. We test the predictions on a data set of large US
companies from 1980 to 1994. Using the CEOs’ personal portfolio decisions to measure over-
conﬁdence, we ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs conduct more mergers and, in particular, more
value-destroying mergers. As predicted, these eﬀects are most pronounced in ﬁrms with abun-
dant cash or untapped debt capacity. Furthermore, the market’s assessment of overconﬁdent
CEOs, reﬂected by press coverage in major business publications and the stock price reaction
to merger announcements, corroborates the overconﬁdence theory.
The idea that mergers may be driven by biases of the acquiring manager has long had popu-
lar appeal, as evidenced by our introductory quote. In the ﬁnance literature, Roll (1986) ﬁrst
introduced the “hubris hypothesis” of corporate takeovers.4 Subsequent studies have found ex-
perimental evidence on overconﬁdence in market entry decisions (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999)
and on the underestimation of cultural conﬂicts in mergers (Weber and Camerer, 2003). Build-
ing on this literature, we propose that overconﬁd e n tC E O so v e r e s t i m a t et h ep o s i t i v ei m p a c to f
1their leadership and their ability to select proﬁtable future projects, whether in their current
company or in a merged company. They may also overestimate the synergies between their
company and a potential target, or underestimate how disruptive a merger will be. As a result,
overconﬁdence induces mergers that are, on the margin, value-destroying. At the same time,
overconﬁdent CEOs view their company as undervalued by outside investors who are less op-
timistic about the prospects of the ﬁrm. This perceived undervaluation makes overconﬁdent
CEOs reluctant to issue equity, e.g. to ﬁnance a merger.
The trade-oﬀ between (perceived) undervaluation and (perceived) high returns from acquisi-
tions leaves the question of whether overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely, on average, to conduct
mergers an empirical matter. However, the model makes the unambiguous prediction that over-
conﬁdent managers are more likely to conduct value-destroying mergers. They are also more
likely to conduct mergers if their ﬁrm has abundant sources of internal ﬁnance and they do not
need to issue “undervalued” equity to ﬁnance the deal. Moreover, the lower average quality
of mergers undertaken by overconﬁdent CEOs should be reﬂected in a (more) negative market
reaction to the merger announcement. This negative announcement eﬀect is reinforced by the
tendency of overconﬁdent CEOs to overpay for their acquisitions in the face of competition.
We test these predictions empirically on a sample of Forbes 500 ﬁrms from 1980 to 1994. Our
main empirical measure of overconﬁdence employs time series data on the CEOs’ holdings
of company stock options in their private portfolios. Previous literature in corporate ﬁnance
shows that risk averse CEOs should exercise stock options well before expiration due to the
suboptimal concentration of their portfolio in company-speciﬁcr i s k . 5 As in Malmendier and
Tate (2003), we classify CEOs as overconﬁdent when they display the opposite behavior, i.e. if
they hold company stock options until the last year before expiration. This behavior suggests
that the CEO is persistently bullish about his company’s future prospects.
We ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers than rational CEOs at
any point in time. The higher acquisitiveness of overconﬁdent CEOs — even “on average” —
suggests that overconﬁdence is an important determinant of merger activity. Moreover, the
eﬀect of overconﬁdence on merger activity comes primarily from an increased likelihood of
conducting diversifying acquisitions. Previous literature suggests that diversifying mergers are
unlikely to create value in the acquiring ﬁrm.6 Thus, it is consistent with our theory that
overconﬁdent managers are particularly likely to undertake them. Second, we ﬁnd that the
relationship between overconﬁdence and the likelihood of doing a merger is strongest when
2CEOs can avoid equity-ﬁnancing., i.e. in the least equity dependent ﬁrms. Overconﬁdent
CEOs strongly prefer cash- or debt-ﬁnanced mergers to stock deals unless their ﬁrm appears
to be overvalued by the market.
Additional empirical tests corroborate our results. We show that the observed diﬀerences in
option exercises and merger decisions are not due to inside information. Instead, the hypo-
thetical returns CEOs could have obtained by exercising their options earlier are positive on
average. In addition, the acquisitions of overconﬁdent managers are distributed uniformly over
their tenures suggesting that the eﬀect of overconﬁdence is a true managerial ﬁxed eﬀect. To
bolster our portfolio measure of overconﬁdence, we construct an alternative measure based on
how a CEO is characterized in the press. We analyze the diﬀerence in merger activity between
CEOs who are portrayed in the business press as “conﬁdent” and “optimistic” and CEOs
who are portrayed instead as “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “frugal,” or
“steady.” Controlling for the total number of press mentions, we perform the same empirical
analysis as with the portfolio overconﬁdence measure. The results replicate. Furthermore, the
two measures are highly correlated.
Finally, we look directly at the market’s perception of the merger decisions made by overcon-
ﬁdent CEOs. Using standard event study methodology, we show that outside investors react
more negatively to the announcement of a bid if the CEO is overconﬁdent. This result holds
even controlling for relatedness of the target and acquiror, ownership stake of the acquiring
CEO, corporate governance of the acquiror, and method of ﬁnancing the merger. Our results
suggest that, even if overconﬁdent CEOs create ﬁrm value along some dimensions7,m e r g e r s
and acquisitions are not among them.
Our theory of managerial overconﬁdence provides a natural complement to standard agency
theory. Both “empire-building preferences” and overconﬁdence predict heightened managerial
acquisitiveness — especially given abundant internal resources — and, as shown in Malmendier
and Tate (2003), a heightened sensitivity of corporate investment to cash ﬂow. Unlike empire-
builders, however, overconﬁdent CEOs, believe that they are acting in the interest of the
shareholders. Thus, overconﬁdence, cast as an agency problem, challenges the eﬀectiveness of
stock and option grants to top executives as an incentive mechanism. On the other hand, it
provides additional underpinning for models of debt overhang. High leverage may eﬀectively
counterbalance an overconﬁdent CEO’s eagerness to invest and acquire, given his reluctance
to issue equity he perceives as undervalued. In addition, the failure of traditional incentives to
3mitigate overconﬁdence underscores the importance of an independent board of directors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present a simple model of managerial
overconﬁdence. In Section II we introduce the data. Section III describes the empirical strategy
and provides evidence that overconﬁdence can explain managerial acquisitiveness. We also
discuss alternative explanations and explore the robustness of our results to changes in the
empirical speciﬁcation. In Section IV, we study the market reaction to mergers by overconﬁdent
CEOs. Section V concludes and provides some broad directions for future research.
IT h e o r y
A Setting and Psychological Foundations
We construct a simple model of managerial overconﬁdence. The model demonstrates the
harmful eﬀects of overconﬁdence on merger decisions in an otherwise frictionless market. In
particular, we assume symmetric information between corporate insiders and outside investors.
Moreover, management acts in the interests of current shareholders. We ﬁrst consider the case
of limited debt capacity. A ﬁrm with scarce cash reserves and high leverage must issue equity
in order to ﬁnance a suﬃciently costly acquisition. We will show later that the introduction of
additional internal funds and untapped debt capacity only increases the incentives of overcon-
ﬁdent managers to conduct acquisitions. Risky debt, on the other hand, has similar properties
to equity since managers and ﬁnanciers might disagree on the appropriate risk-adjusted rate.
Our analysis focuses on one type of heterogeneity among managers, overconﬁdence in their
own abilities. The hypothesis of managerial overconﬁdence has a foundation in the psychology
literature on self-enhancement. Psychologists ﬁnd that individuals tend to overestimate their
abilities when comparing themselves to an anonymous benchmark or to their peers (Larwood
and Whittaker, 1977; Svenson, 1981; Alicke et al. 1995; Weinstein and Klein, 2002;).8 The
“better than average eﬀect” also aﬀects the attribution of causality. Because individuals expect
their behavior to produce success, they attribute good outcomes to their actions, but bad
outcomes to chance (Miller and Ross, 1975). This self-serving attribution of outcomes reinforces
individual overconﬁdence.9
Psychologists have found that executives are particularly prone to display overconﬁdence (Kidd,
1970; Larwood and Whittaker, 1977; Moore, 1977; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Baron
4(2000) surveys related literature on “cognitive factors in entrepreneurship,” noting prominently
the tendency of entrepreneurs to be overconﬁdent in their own judgements. Individuals are
especially overconﬁdent about outcomes that they believe are under their control and about
outcomes to which they are highly committed (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein and Klein, 2002).
Both scenarios apply to the merger decisions of CEOs. First, a CEO who conducts a merger
is ostensibly replacing the current management of the target ﬁrm with himself. Therefore, he
is likely to feel the illusion of control over the outcome and to underestimate the likelihood of
eventual failure (Langer, 1975; March and Shapira 1987). Second, a successful merger enhances
the CEO’s professional standing and his future employment prospects. In addition, the typical
compensation contract of a CEO ties his personal wealth to the company’s stock price and,
hence, to the outcomes of his acquisition decisions.
In our theoretical framework, overconﬁdence manifests itself in two forms. First, an overconﬁ-
dent manager overestimates the value of the potential merger, either due to the belief that his
leadership skills are “better than average” (and, by implication, better than the target’s current
management) or due to an underestimation of the downside to the merger. Second, he believes
that his company’s equity is undervalued by the market, again due to the overestimation of
his leadership skills and his ability to “hand-pick” proﬁtable investment projects.
The basic notation of the model is as follows. There are two companies, Acquiror A and Target
T, which have market values of VA and VT respectively. The manager of A chooses whether
or not to acquire T. W ed e n o t eb yc the total internal resources (cash and riskless debt)
available to the manager of A and by c the amount of cash he pays to the target shareholders
as part of the merger ﬁnancing. V (c) is the market value of the combination of A and T, b V (c)
the A manager’s valuation of the combination of A and T,a n db VA his perception of his own
company’s value if he does not pursue the merger. We call a CEO overconﬁdent when b VA >V A
and b V (c)−V (c) > b VA−VA for some c.T h eﬁrst condition is that the CEO overvalues his own
company. The second condition is that the CEO overvalues the merger.
We examine the impact of overconﬁdence on several dimensions: the decision to undertake
an acquisition, the means of ﬁnance, and the ultimate payment oﬀered to target sharehold-
ers. First, we explore the tradeoﬀ between heightened acquisitiveness and perceived ﬁnancing
constraints in a world with a single bidder for the target company. However, in this simpliﬁed
framework, only an assumption on the relative bargaining power of the target and the acquiror
can uniquely identify the amount of the transfer from the acquiror to the target shareholders.
5Later, we consider a more general model with multiple bidders in which we endogenously derive
potential over-payment by overconﬁdent acquirors.
B Acquisition Decision of a Rational CEO
We ﬁrst consider the takeover decision of a single rational bidder. For simplicity, we assume
the acquiror has all bargaining power and, thus, must pay VT for the target.10 If he oﬀers an
amount c<V T of cash ﬁnancing (or other non-diluting assets), target shareholders demand a
share s of the merged company such that sV (c)=VT − c. Since the CEO acts in the interest
of current shareholders, he chooses to conduct the takeover if and only if V (c)−(VT −c) >V A.
Denoting the merger synergies as e ∈ R , we can decompose V (c) into
(1) V (c)=VA + VT + e − c
Thus the manager decides to acquire whenever e>0. Not surprisingly, the rational CEO
makes the ﬁrst best acquisition decision. Moreover, his decision is independent of c. Since the
capital market is fully eﬃcient, there is no extra cost of raising external capital to ﬁnance the
merger and the CEO is indiﬀerent among cash, equity, or a combination.
C Acquisition Decision of an Overconﬁdent CEO
An overconﬁdent CEO overestimates the future value he can generate. In terms of our model,
overconﬁdence implies b VA >V A and b V (c) − V (c) > b VA − VA for some cash payment c.A sa
result, the value of a merger to an overconﬁdent manager depends on the means of ﬁnancing. In
particular, an overconﬁdent manager perceives a cost to ﬁnancing with undervalued shares.11
Since the target shareholders, like the market, believe that the merged company will be worth
V (c), they demand a share s of the merged company such that sV (c)=VT − c. Whenever
b V (c) >V (c), the acquiring CEO believes that issuing new equity entails a loss to current
shareholders of (VT−c
V (c) − VT−c
e V (c) )b V (c). He undertakes the merger despite this perceived cost if
he believes the value of the diluted shares in the merged company to A’s current shareholders
is greater than the value of A forsaking the merger. That is, he undertakes the merger if and
only if (1−s)b V (c) > b VA for some c ≤ ¯ c. Substituting for s,h ea c q u i r e sT iﬀ b V (c)−(VT − c)−
[e V (c)−V (c)](VT−c)
V (c) > b VA for some c. That is, the manager’s perceived valuation of the merged
company minus what he must give to target shareholders minus the perceived loss due to
6dilution must exceed his perceived value of A without the merger. Denoting the “perceived”
additional merger synergies as b e ∈ R++,12 we can decompose b V (c) into
(2) b V (c)=b VA + VT + e + b e − c
Then, using (1) and (2), the overconﬁdent manager’s decision rule is to merge whenever e+b e>
(e VA−VA+e e)(VT−c)
V (c) . That is, he merges whenever total perceived merger synergies exceed the
perceived loss due to dilution. Combining these results with the results of the prior section
yields the following propositions.
Proposition 1 An overconﬁdent CEO exhausts his supply of internal (non-diluting) assets
before issuing equity to ﬁnance a merger.
Proof: An overconﬁdent CEO perceives the post-acquisition value of the ﬁrm to current share-





VA+VT+e−c ,w h e r et h el a s te q u a l i t y
uses (1) and (2). Then ∂G
∂c =
(VA+e)(e VA−VA+e e)
(V (c))2 > 0 (as b VA >V A and b e>0 by assumption).
Post-merger value is maximized on c ∈ [0,V T] by setting c as high as possible.
Proposition 2 A rational CEO never conducts a value-destroying merger. An overconﬁdent
CEO conducts a value-destroying merger if the perceived synergies ˆ e are suﬃciently large
relative to the perceived undervaluation (b VA − VA) and the portion of the deal ﬁnanced by
equity VT−c
V .
Proof: The claim that a rational CEO does not conduct a value-destroying merger follows
directly from his ﬁrst-best decision rule (see Section B). In Section C, we showed that an
overconﬁdent CEO conducts a merger whenever e + b e>(e VA−VA+e e)(VT−c)
V (c) .T h u s , i f e ≤ 0,h e
still conducts the merger as long as b e>|e| and b VA − VA and VT−c
V (c) are suﬃciently small.
Proposition 3 Suppose c ≥ VT, i.e. internal resources exceed the value of the target. Then,
an overconﬁdent CEO will conduct all mergers a rational CEO would conduct and some value-
destroying mergers that a rational CEO would not conduct.
Proof: Since the overconﬁdent manager has internal resources in excess of VT,h ew i l ls e t
c = VT by Proposition 1. Then, the condition for conducting the merger becomes e + b e>0.
7Since the rational CEO merges whenever e>0 (see Section B) and b e>0,t h eﬁrst part of
Proposition 3 follows. The last statement of the proposition follows directly from Proposition
2.
Proposition 4 Suppose c<V T. Then, an overconﬁdent CEO does some value-destroying
mergers that a rational CEO would not and a rational CEO does some value-creating mergers
that the overconﬁdent CEO would not.
Proof: The ﬁrst statement follows from Proposition 2. To show the second statement, suppose
e>0. Then, the rational CEO always does the merger (see Section B). From Section C, the
overconﬁdent CEO will not do the merger if and only if e + b e<(e VA−VA+e e)(VT−c)
V (c) ,i . e .i fb e is
suﬃciently small and b VA − VA or VT−c
V (c) are suﬃciently large.
D Competing Bidders
So far, we have determined the transfer from the acquiror to the target shareholders by our
allocation of bargaining power to the acquiror. Next, we endogenize this payment by allowing
the possibility of competition. Suppose that there are I companies, denoted Ai, i =1 ,...,I,
that compete for control of T in an English auction. Denote by Wi the Ai manager’s maximal
willingness to pay for T.S i n c eWi i ss i m p l yt h em a r k e tv a l u eo ft h et a r g e tp l u st h e( p e r c e i v e d )
surplus to Ai’s current shareholders as a result of the merger, we can quantify Wi as follows:
1. Wi = VT + ei if the Ai manager is rational.
2. Wi = VT + ei + b ei − 1{¯ ci<Wi}
(e VAi−VAi+e ei)(Wi−¯ ci)
VAi+VT+ei−¯ ci if the Ai manager is overconﬁdent.
Then, the equilibrium outcome is the following.13 For maxWi ≥ VT,
1. the winning bidder is Ai∗,w h e r ei∗ =a r gm a x i Wi;
2. the winning bid is b∗ =m a x {(maxi6=i∗ Wi),V T}.
It is interesting to note that, contrary to Roll’s theory, an overconﬁdent bidder does not always
bid higher than a rational bidder, even if the actual synergies of the merger are smaller for the
8rational bidder. In particular, an overconﬁdent bidder who is considerably more overconﬁdent
about the value of his own company than about the merger may lose the takeover contest.
Most importantly, heterogeneity in the merger synergies can increase the transfer to target
shareholders and, when interacted with overconﬁdence, can lead to over-payment. Formally,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose an overconﬁdent manager (i∗) wins the takeover contest. Then, he
will over-pay if maxi6=i∗ Wi ∈ (VT + ei∗,W i∗).
Before turning to the empirical predictions of the model, we brieﬂyd i s c u s st w oi m p o r t a n t
extensions. First, overconﬁdent CEOs might not only overvalue their potential leadership in
other companies, but also the returns from their hand-selected internal investment projects
(Malmendier and Tate 2003). This eﬀect could counteract their increased acquisitiveness if
resources are scarce. An extended model of corporate decision-making would include the menus
of both potential acquisitions and internal projects. When new resources become available to
the CEO, he would initiate the next project on either or both menus. While relative returns
would determine which project he chooses ﬁrst, for a suﬃcient inﬂux of resources, we would
expect the CEO to increase the number of projects of both types.14
Second, we have focused exclusively on overconﬁdence in acquiring managers. Indeed, overcon-
ﬁdence may be an important force in distinguishing acquirors from targets. However, target
managers may be overconﬁdent as well. While overconﬁdence of target managers will not
change the qualitative predictions of our model, it yields many interesting comparative statics.
For example, acquisitions of target ﬁrms with overconﬁdent management are more likely to be
hostile takeovers. The overconﬁdent target management might believe they can create at least
as much value as the potential acquirors and, hence, view all but the most lucrative bids as too
low. Similarly, we would expect acquirors to pay a higher premium for targets with overcon-
ﬁdent managers, even in friendly deals. As a result, the acquirors of ﬁrms with overconﬁdent
managers are likely to be among the most overconﬁdent managers. In both cases, overcon-
ﬁdence on the side of the target management can be beneﬁcial to the target shareholders.
Unfortunately, we cannot test any of these implications due to data limitations.15
9E Empirical Predictions
In the remainder of the paper, we test the empirical implications of our model. To facili-
tate the translation of the model into predictions about a cross-section of CEOs, we suppose
that e is drawn independently from the same distribution for all potential mergers. That is,
overconﬁdent and rational CEOs do not have systematically diﬀerent merger opportunities.
The ﬁrst quantity of interest is the diﬀerence in the average probability of conducting a merger
for overconﬁdent and rational CEOs. As noted above, overconﬁdence does not imply an un-
ambiguous prediction about this quantity. However, higher average acquisitiveness of overcon-
ﬁdent managers would indicate the importance of overconﬁdence as a general explanation of
observed merger activity. Moreover, the model delivers three testable predictions. Proposition
2 and Proposition 3 imply (respectively):
Prediction 1. Overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers that ex ante have a
high probability of failure (and negative expected return).
Prediction 2. Among CEOs with abundant internal resources (e.g. large cash reserves and
low leverage), overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely to conduct acquisitions.
Finally, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 together imply that mergers conducted by overconﬁ-
dent CEOs will be worse on average than mergers conducted by rational CEOs. In addition,
Proposition 5 shows that overconﬁdent managers are prone to overpay for their acquisitions in
the face of potential competition. Since we have maintained the assumption that the market
is eﬃcient, all information about the quality and terms of the deal will be incorporated at the
announcement date and we have the following prediction.
Prediction 3. The diﬀerence between the average stock price reaction to the announcement
of a merger bid by an overconﬁdent CEO and the average stock price reaction for a rational
CEO is negative.
Note that the assumption of symmetric information implies that the merger announcement does
not convey any information about the fundamentals of the acquiring company. In practice,
information revelation will have an impact on the announcement eﬀect (e.g. in Hietala et al.,
2002). For simplicity, we assume that the average eﬀect of such information revelation is the
same among overconﬁdent and rational CEOs.
10II Data
We analyze a sample of 477 large publicly-traded United States ﬁrms from the years 1980 to
1994. To be included in the sample, a ﬁrm must appear at least four times on one of the lists
of largest US companies compiled by Forbes magazine in the period from 1984 to 1994. This
criterion essentially excludes IPOs from our sample. Thus, the more stringent restrictions on
insider trading associated with such ﬁrms, such as lockup periods, do not apply. The core of
the data set is described in detail in Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995). The virtue
of this data is that it provides us with detailed information on the stock ownership and set
of option packages — including exercise price, remaining duration, and number of underlying
shares — for the CEO of each company in each year. From this data we obtain a fairly detailed
picture of the CEO’s portfolio rebalancing over his tenure.
We also collect data on how the press portrays each of the CEOs during the sample period. We
search for articles referring to the CEOs in The New York Times, Business Week, Financial
Times, and The Economist using LexisNexis and for articles in the The Wall Street Journal
using Factiva.com. For each CEO, we record four statistics: the total number of articles; the
number of articles containing the words “conﬁdent” or “conﬁdence;” the number of articles
containing the words “optimistic” or “optimism;” and the number of articles containing the
words “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “frugal,” or “steady.” We hand-check
each article to be sure that the terms are used to describe the CEO in question. In the process
of scanning the search output, we separate out any articles speciﬁcally describing the CEO as
“not conﬁdent” or “not optimistic.”
We supplement this CEO-level data with merger data from the SDC and CRSP merger data-
bases. Both data sets give us the announcement date and means of ﬁnancing for mergers
conducted by our sample of ﬁrms. The CRSP data set covers only mergers with CRSP-listed
target ﬁrms. We use the SDC data to supplement the set of mergers with acquisitions of pri-
vate ﬁrms and large subsidiaries. We include only successful merger bids and, following Morck
et al., (1990), we omit mergers in which the value of the target is less than ﬁve percent of the
value of the acquiror.16 We supplement the data with various items from the COMPUSTAT
database. We measure ﬁrm size as the natural logarithm of assets (item 6) at the beginning
of the year. We measure investment as capital expenditures (item 128), cash ﬂow as earn-
ings before extraordinary items (item 18) plus depreciation (item 14), and capital as property,
11plants and equipment (item 8). We normalize investment and cash ﬂow with beginning of the
year capital. Given that our sample is not limited to manufacturing ﬁrms (though it mainly
consists of large, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms), we check the robustness of our results to normalization
by assets (item 6). We measure Q as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.
Market value of assets is deﬁned as total assets (item6) plus market equity minus book equity.
Market equity is deﬁned as common shares outstanding (item 25) times ﬁscal year closing
price (item 199). Book equity is calculated as total assets (item 6) minus total liabilities (item
181) minus preferred stock (item 10) plus deferred taxes (item 35) plus convertible debt (item
79). When preferred stock is missing, we replace it with the redemption value of preferred
stock. Book value of assets is total assets (item 6).17 Further, we use ﬁscal year closing prices
(item 199) adjusted for stock splits (item 27) to calculate annual stock returns. We also use
CRSP to gather stock prices and 2 and 4 digit SIC codes for the companies in our sample and
the target ﬁrms in CRSP acquisitions. Missing accounting data (largely from ﬁnancial ﬁrms)
leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 320 ﬁrms. As in Malmendier and Tate (2003), we trim cash
ﬂow at the 1% level to deal with several extreme outliers. However, all results of the paper can
be replicated with the full data set. The outliers only inﬂuence the estimates at all when we
run regressions on quintiles of the data set in Subsection E and only in the quintiles of lesser
interest.
In addition, we collected personal information about the CEOs in our sample using Dun and
Bradstreet and Who’s Who in Finance and Industry. We broadly classify a CEO’s educational
background as technical, ﬁnancial, or miscellaneous. We consider an MBA, a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics or ﬁnance, an undergraduate degree in ﬁnance, or similar educational backgrounds to
constitute a ﬁnance education. Similarly, undergraduate or graduate degrees in engineering,
physics, operations research, chemistry, mathematics, biology, pharmacy, and other applied
sciences constitute technical education.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data, divided into ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (Panel A)
and CEO-speciﬁc variables (Panel B). The mean, median and standard deviation of all variables
are remarkably similar for overconﬁdent and non-overconﬁdent CEOs; only the number of
vested options that have not been exercised is considerably higher among overconﬁdent CEOs.
This diﬀerence could stem from overconﬁdence, as we will see later, but, regardless, we will
control for the level of vested options in all of our regressions. Table 2 provides information
about the mergers. Panel A presents summary statistics of the mergers undertaken by CEOs
in our sample; panel B summarizes merger ﬁnancing, both for our sample and for all U.S.
12mergers during the sample period.
III The Impact of Overconﬁdence on Acquisitiveness
A Measure of Overconﬁdence
We use the timing of option exercises to identify overconﬁdence. Previous literature shows
that it is typically not optimal for risk-averse, underdiversiﬁed executives to hold their options
until expiration (Lambert et al., 1991; Carpenter, 1998; Hall and Murphy, 2002). CEO com-
pensation contracts regularly contain large quantities of stock and option grants in lieu of cash
compensation. While diversiﬁed investors should value options as if they were risk-neutral and,
therefore, never forgo option value by exercising an option early (Black and Scholes, 1973),
CEOs cannot trade their options or hedge the risk by short-selling company stock. Employ-
ment contracts can also limit the frequency and quantity of divestitures CEOs may undertake
in any given year. As a result, CEOs’ personal portfolios are likely to include too much of their
own companies’ idiosyncratic risks. In addition, their human capital is invested in their ﬁrm,
further increasing their exposure to company-speciﬁc risk. Thus, the Black-Scholes formula
will not apply. Instead, a CEO must trade-oﬀ the option-value of holding stock options against
the costs of underdiversiﬁcation. Though the optimal exercise schedule depends on individual
wealth, diversiﬁcation, and risk-aversion, a risk-averse CEO should generally exercise options
early given a suﬃciently high stock price.
In our data, the behavior of a subset of CEOs cannot be reconciled with any reasonable
calibration of a model of rational option exercise. The typical option in our sample has a
duration of ten years and is fully vested after four years. 13% of the CEOs in our sample hold
an option at least once until the year of expiration. These options are typically highly in the
money, with a median of 278% at the beginning of the ﬁnal year. As a frame of reference, Hall
and Murphy (2002) ﬁnd that a CEO should exercise an option during year 9 if it reaches 40%
in the money (given a constant coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 3 and 67% of wealth in
company stock). Holding an option until its ﬁnal year, even when it is highly in the money,
indicates that the CEO has been consistently “bullish” about the company’s prospects. Rather
than taking the current value of the option and investing in a diversiﬁed portfolio, the CEO
is repeatedly betting his personal wealth on the company’s future returns. Thus, we classify a
13CEO as overconﬁdent (and set the dummy variable “longholder” equal to 1)i fh ee v e rd u r i n g
his tenure as CEO holds an option until the last year before expiration. Though large stock
or option holdings (ownership levels) might also indicate suboptimal exposure to company-
speciﬁc risk, they are not entirely under the CEO’s control (e.g. they are adjusted by the
board to confer incentives) and are, therefore, inappropriate as overconﬁdence measures. Table
3 presents the correlation of our longholder measure with various ﬁrm and CEO characteristics.
There are a number of potential alternative interpretations of this measure of overconﬁdence.
In the remainder of this section, we will ﬁrst apply our measure of overconﬁdence and show
that overconﬁdent CEOs are signiﬁcantly more likely to undertake mergers. We will then show
that none of the alternative explanations can explain both the option-exercise behavior and
the merger decisions of these CEOs.
B Empirical Speciﬁcation
To test the eﬀect of managerial overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness, we use the following general
regression speciﬁcation:
(3) Pr{Yit =1 |Oit,X it} = G(β1 + β2Oit + X0
itB)
O is the “longholder” overconﬁdence measure. The set of controls X includes Tobin’s Q,
cash ﬂow, size, a measure of corporate governance, ownership, unexercised vested options
(normalized by total number of shares outstanding) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Y is a binary
variable that, unless otherwise speciﬁed, takes the value 1 if the CEO made at least one
successful merger bid in a particular ﬁrm year. Throughout the paper, we assume that G is
the logistic distribution.18 The null hypothesis is that β2,t h ec o e ﬃcient on overconﬁdence, is
equal to zero.
There are two kinds of variation we can use to identify the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on ac-
quisitiveness, cross-sectional and within-company variation. As an example for the ﬁrst type,
consider the case of Wayne Huizenga, CEO of Blockbuster Entertainment Group for all 7 years
the ﬁrm appears in our data. Since he holds some options until the year of expiration, we clas-
sify him as overconﬁdent. He also, during those 7 years, conducts 6 acquisitions. Similarly,
David Farrell is CEO of May Department Stores — the holding company of Lord & Taylor,
Filene’s, and Robinsons-May, among others — for the 15 years it appears in our sample and
is classiﬁed as overconﬁdent. He conducts 5 mergers during those 15 years. By contrast, J.
14Willard Marriott of Marriott International is CEO of his company for all 15 years of our sam-
ple, but never holds an option until expiration. He also never conducts an acquisition. By
comparing these two types of CEOs, we can identify a cross-sectional eﬀect of overconﬁdence
on acquisitiveness. As an example of within-company variation, consider Colgate Palmolive.
For the ﬁrst 4 years, the CEO is Keith Crane. Crane never holds an option until expiration
and he never conducts an acquisition. Reuben Mark succeeds him as CEO in 1984. Over
the next 11 years, he holds some options until the year of expiration and he also conducts
4 acquisitions. So, by comparing overconﬁdent and rational CEOs within the same ﬁrm, we
might also identify a positive eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness.
We estimate Equation (3) using three estimation procedures. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation, a logit
regression, makes use of both types of variation. The second, a logit regression with random
eﬀects, also makes use of both types of variation. But, it explicitly models the eﬀect of the ﬁrm,
rather than the CEO, on acquisitiveness. Note that if the estimated eﬀects of overconﬁdence
in the logit speciﬁcation were due to ﬁrm eﬀects, we would expect to see a decline in our
estimates when we include random eﬀects. Finally, we estimate Equation (3) using a logit
regression with ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation makes use only of the second type of variation.
That is, we estimate the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness using only variation between
overconﬁdent and rational CEOs within a particular ﬁrm. To estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects model
consistently, we use conditional logit. Conditioning the likelihood on the number of successes
in each panel, we avoid estimating the coeﬃcients of the ﬁxed eﬀects themselves and obtain
consistent estimates of the remaining coeﬃcients. The ﬁxed eﬀects approach eliminates any
time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀect on average acquisitiveness. The disadvantage of the procedure is
that it induces sample-selection bias. Only ﬁrms that conduct at least one merger during the
sample period and that had at least one overconﬁdent and one non-overconﬁdent CEO are
included in the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. In Table 4, for example, the number of observations
drops from 3690 to 2261 and the number of ﬁrms from 327 to 184 when we move from the
logit to the ﬁxed eﬀects logit speciﬁcation. To show that neither cross-sectional variation nor
sample selection are biasing our results, we present the results of all three speciﬁcations.
CO v e r a l l I m p a c t o f O v e r c o n ﬁdence
We ﬁrst estimate Equation (3) on our entire sample of ﬁrm years. A positive eﬀect of overcon-
ﬁdence on average is not necessary to conﬁrm the predictions of our overconﬁdence model (see
15Section I). However, such a ﬁnding would indicate that overconﬁdence explains a signiﬁcant
amount of observed merger activity.
Table 4 contains the results. All coeﬃcients are presented as odds ratios. The ﬁrst column is a
logit estimation on only our longholder overconﬁdence measure. We ﬁnd a positive and strongly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, where standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and unspeciﬁed
within-ﬁrm correlation. Standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and unspeciﬁed
within-year correlation are even smaller, suggesting that within-ﬁrm serial correlation is the
more serious concern. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is quite large. We ﬁnd an odds ratio of
1.68; that is, the odds of an overconﬁdent manager making a successful takeover bid are 1.68
times the odds of a rational manager. More speciﬁcally, the odds of a rational CEO are 0.095
(or nearly 1 in 10) and the odds for an overconﬁdent CEO are roughly 0.159.
In the remaining columns of Table 4, we modify the analysis to account for other potential
factors in the decision to conduct a merger. In column 2, we include the logarithm of assets
at the beginning of the year as a control for ﬁrm size, Tobin’s Q at the beginning of the year
as a control for investment opportunities, an indicator for eﬃc i e n tb o a r ds i z ea sam e a s u r eo f
corporate governance19,a n dc a s hﬂow as a measure of internal resources. We also include two
controls for the incentive eﬀects of holding company stock and options: the percent of company
equity held by the CEO at the beginning of the year and the number of options exercisable
within six months of the beginning of the year, normalized by total shares outstanding.
The eﬀects of these controls appear to be largely orthogonal to the eﬀect of overconﬁdence.
CEOs who persistently hold options are still signiﬁcantly more acquisitive on average. On the
surface, it appears that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to conduct a merger; however, much of
this result may be mechanical within-ﬁrm variation. That is, the assets of a ﬁrm are necessarily
larger after a merger. Because our sample already selects ﬁrms based on size, this eﬀect can
overwhelm the cross-sectional variation. It does not aﬀect the remaining coeﬃcients, though;
running the regressions without size yields the same results. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with lower
values of Tobin’s Q are more likely to conduct mergers, suggesting that acquisitions may be
a substitute for proﬁtable investment opportunities.20 Further, more cash ﬂow leads to more
acquisition activity, as expected if cash eases ﬁnancing constraints. Eﬀective corporate gov-
ernance strongly mitigates CEO acquisitiveness. Stock ownership and higher levels of vested
options appear to have a positive (though mostly insigniﬁcant) eﬀect on acquisitiveness in the
cross-section, but the eﬀect reverses when we restrict attention to within-ﬁrm variation (Col-
16umn 6). The positive cross-sectional eﬀect is consistent with (high) stock and option holdings
being a noisy proxy for overconﬁdence; however, we are reluctant to make this interpretation
since the CEO does not have full control over ownership levels. The negative within-ﬁrm eﬀect
is consistent with an incentive interpretation since mergers destroy value for the acquiror, on
average.
Column 3 adds year ﬁxed eﬀects to the regression. As noted in the introduction, the literature
has identiﬁed a myriad of epoch-speciﬁc explanations for merger activity. Controlling for
this variation, however, does not impact our estimates of the overconﬁdence eﬀect. Similarly,
Column 4 adds industry ﬁxed eﬀects and the interaction of industry eﬀects with the year eﬀects
to the regression.21 This speciﬁcation allows us to control for the possibility that mergers
cluster within industries over time, as argued by Andrade et al., (2001). Again, there is only a
negligible impact on the results. Thus, overconﬁdence appears to be an explanation of merger
activity that generalizes across merger waves.
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 control for unspeciﬁed ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in the probability of
conducting a merger. Though the regressions in the previous columns explicitly address the
most natural ﬁrm characteristics that might aﬀect acquisitiveness, there may be an omitted,
or even unobservable, ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable that leads to more acquisitiveness and positively
correlates with our overconﬁdence measure. To rule out this possibility, we ﬁrst explicitly
model the average probability of conducting a merger within each ﬁrm as a random draw from
a normal distribution. The random eﬀects speciﬁcation controls for potential ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬀects on merger activity without eliminating all between ﬁrm variation from the analysis. As
reported in Column 5, taking this step actually increases both the magnitude and signiﬁcance of
our estimate of the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness. In Column 6, we eliminate ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects and identify the overconﬁdence eﬀect using only cases in which an overconﬁdent
manager either precedes or follows a rational manager within a ﬁrm. Here the magnitude of
the overconﬁdence eﬀect substantially increases. An overconﬁdent manager now has 2.53 times
the odds of doing a merger compared to a rational manager.22
Thus, all of the regressions conﬁrm that overconﬁdence is an important determinant of merger
activity, even on average.
Alternative Explanations. Before examining the speciﬁc predictions of our model, we
discuss some alternative interpretations of our measure of overconﬁdence.
171. Inside information. An important determinant of option exercise is private information.
CEOs may delay the exercise of vested options beyond the rational benchmark when they
have positive inside information about the prospects of their company. However, in order to
explain repeated delay of option-exercise over a multi-year horizon, inside information has to be
persistently positive, rather than random (i.e. sometimes positive and sometimes negative) over
time. Most importantly, to explain both the persistent delay and the increased acquisitiveness
of CEOs, the positive inside information must be related to upcoming or recently completed
mergers. Thus, we should observe insider trades right around mergers, which does not seem to
be the case empirically (Boehmer and Netter, 1997). Nevertheless, we perform two additional
tests to distinguish between inside information and overconﬁdence.
First, if inside information were the main explanation of our ﬁndings, we should see a con-
centration of mergers in the years following the vesting date of those options that the CEO
holds until expiration. To test for evidence on the joint timing of option exercise and mergers,
we estimate Equation (3), splitting longholder into two dummies: an indicator for the last 3
(4 or 5)y e a r s 23 of an option that is held until expiration and an indicator for the remaining
years of the overconﬁdent CEO’s tenure (Table 5). We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness for years in which the CEO is holding
the vested option (i.e. when he is identiﬁed as overconﬁdent) and when he is not. If anything,
we ﬁnd weak evidence that the eﬀect on acquisitiveness is smaller while the CEO is holding the
option.24 We also run random eﬀects logit regressions of (3) in the subsample of overconﬁdent
CEOs, i.e. we condition on longholder being equal to 1. Again, we include dummies for the
last 3, 4, or 5 years of an option that is held until expiration. As before, we ﬁnd no evidence
that overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers in the particular period we use to
identify them as overconﬁd e n t ,i . e .i nt h el a s t3,4 or 5 years of the duration of an option that
is held until expiration, relative to the rest of their tenures.
We also test directly whether inside information inﬂuences the decision to hold an option to
expiration. In particular, the CEO may have held the option due to private information about
the company’s prospects unrelated to his merger projects. Though it is diﬃcult to explain how
this form of private information would lead to heightened acquisitiveness, we can nevertheless
address its potential impact on our overconﬁdence measure. In Panel A of Table 6, we calculate
the hypothetical returns that longholder CEOs could have realized had they exercised their
options even one year before expiration and invested the proceeds in the S&P 500. We make
this calculation for all CEOs whose options were at least 40% in the money at the start of the
18ﬁnal year, again using Hall and Murphy (2002) as a benchmark. We assume that both the
hypothetical exercise and actual exercise occur at the maximum stock price during the ﬁscal
year. We ﬁnd that, on average, longholder CEOs did not proﬁt by holding until expiration
compared to this alternative strategy. Indeed, the average return to exercising a year earlier
is positive, though statistically insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the heightened acquisitiveness among
longholder CEOs is due almost entirely to CEOs who more often than not lost money by
holding their options until expiration (Table 6, Panel B). Thus, inside information appears to
have little power to explain the properties of our longholder measure. We also replicate these
results assuming hypothetical exercise 2,3,4, and 5 years before expiration.25 The average
CEO would have done better under all four alternative strategies than by holding to expiration.
And, in all cases the heightened acquisitiveness of longholder CEOs is stronger for the “losing”
CEOs. For example, looking 5 years before expiration, the odds ratio on the “loser” portion of
longholder is 1.7, but only 1.27 for those CEOs who, more often than not, proﬁted by holding.
2. Signalling. A closely related story, that also derives from an information asymmetry about
the merger, is that longholder CEOs are holding their options until expiration as a signal to
the market about the merger. Again, the evidence that mergers do not cluster in time when
the CEO fails to exercise options speaks strongly against this alternative story. Further, as
we will see in Section IV, the market responds more negatively to the mergers conducted by
“longholder” CEOs than by their peers. Thus, holding options until expiration does not convey
positive information about the merger to the market.
3. Stock price bubbles. Another explanation for merger activity is that CEOs exploit stock
price bubbles and trade their overvalued equity for the assets of the target company (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2002; Dong et al., 2002). This story can incorporate the observed (non-)exercise
behavior if managers want to reap the beneﬁts of the bubble or to avoid “popping” it with a
negative signal. However, to the extent that “overvaluation” is a market-wide phenomenon, the
time ﬁxed eﬀects already control for it. In addition, our conditional logit estimation eliminates
all cross-sectional variation. What remains to be checked is whether the probability of doing
a merger moves with the stock price of a particular ﬁrm. To test whether lagged stock returns
can explain both the probability of doing a merger and our longholder indicator, we estimate
Equation (3) adding ﬁve lags of stock returns to our set of controls. We ﬁnd that our estimates
of the eﬀect of longholder on acquisitiveness are unaﬀected (Table 7). In addition, the lags of
returns have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on merger decisions.
194. Stock price volatility. Another reason why some CEOs may hold their options longer than
their peers is that their companies’ stocks are more volatile. High volatility of the underlying
asset increases option value and the threshold for exercise. We can link this behavior to
increased acquisitiveness if these CEOs conduct mergers to diversify the corporate account
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Indeed, we will show in Section D that much of the acquisitiveness of
overconﬁdent CEOs is due to diversifying mergers. However, the fact that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of overconﬁdence using a ﬁxed eﬀects logit speciﬁcation implies that cross-
sectional variation in volatility among ﬁrms cannot explain our results. Only variation in
volatility across the tenures of CEOs in the same company could potentially confound the
estimation. So, we estimate Equation (3) including our usual controls and adding the volatility
of returns over the prior year as a control. We ﬁnd that volatility has no explanatory power for
the time series of merger activity within a ﬁrm and our estimate of the overconﬁdence eﬀect
is virtually unchanged (2.72 with ﬁxed eﬀects).
5. Risk Neutrality. CEOs might hold options until expiration if they are risk neutral or if they
manage to perfectly hedge the risk of their options, despite the prohibition of trading and
short sales. However, shareholders should prefer a risk neutral CEO over a risk-averse CEO
since they are not prevented from diversifying their portfolios. So, if risk aversion dampens
acquisitiveness and longholder measures risk neutrality, the market should react positively to
the extra bids of longholders. In Section IV, we show that, instead, the market reacts more
negatively on average to the bids of longholder CEOs than other acquirors.
6. Finance Education and Other Personal Characteristics. To test whether educational back-
ground determines both the option exercise and the merger behavior of CEOs, we estimate
Equation (3) including an indicator of ﬁnancial education. Finance education has a positive
impact on acquisitiveness, but the eﬀect is orthogonal to overconﬁdence. Similarly, other CEO
characteristics (being president and chairman, age, tenure) do not impact the estimated eﬀect
of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness (and are not individually signiﬁcant). Thus, it is unlikely
that longholder captures an observable CEO characteristic other than overconﬁdence.
There are other explanations of why CEOs may hold options until expiration (like procrastina-
tion) or conduct more mergers than their peers. These stories, however, cannot simultaneously
explain takeovers and excessive option holding.
20DO v e r c o n ﬁdence and Diversifying Mergers
We have found that overconﬁdent managers, on average, are more likely to make a successful
merger bid than their rational peers. The empirical results suggest that exuberance about
potential merger synergies dominates the countervailing eﬀect of perceived undervaluation,
even on average. We now test the speciﬁc predictions of our model of overconﬁdence.
According to our model, overconﬁdent managers are more likely than rational managers to
undertake a merger project that, ex ante, is unlikely to increase value (Prediction 1). To test
this prediction, we attempt to identify a subset of mergers that, ex ante, is unlikely to create
value. We hypothesize that diversifying mergers are such a subset. Not only is there ample
support in the academic literature for this assumption, but the market also seems to recognize
in advance that many diversifying bids are unwise. Morck et al., (1990) document a negative
market reaction when a ﬁrm announces a diversifying deal, an eﬀect we conﬁrm in our data in
Section IV.26
Using diversiﬁcation as a proxy for mergers with negative expected value, we estimate Equation
(3) with a dependent variable that indicates a successful diversifying bid in a particular ﬁrm
year. Bids are deﬁned as diversifying if the acquiror and target ﬁrms are not members of the
same Fama-French 48 industry group. We also estimate Equation (3) with a dependent variable
that indicates a successful intra-industry bid. Table 8 shows that overconﬁdent managers
are far more likely to do diversifying mergers than rational managers. In the ﬁxed eﬀects
logit speciﬁcation, the odds ratio on the longholder measure of overconﬁdence is 3.15.B y
comparison, the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on all mergers, reported in Table 4, is 2.53. And,
though the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on the likelihood of making a related bid appears to be
positive (1.51), the z-statistic of 0.75 is far below conventional standards of signiﬁcance.
Thus, the economically large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisi-
tiveness is due mainly to overconﬁdent managers conducting more destructive mergers. This
ﬁnding conﬁrms Prediction 1 of our model.
EO v e r c o n ﬁdence and Internal Resources
Our second prediction is that overconﬁdence matters most in ﬁrms with abundant internal
resources. If a ﬁrm can ﬁnance an acquisition without issuing equity, perceived undervaluation
21by the capital market will have less of an eﬀect on the CEO’s enthusiasm for the merger. Cash
and safe debt allow the CEO and current shareholders to remain the residual claimants on all
of the merger’s future value. Furthermore, an overconﬁdent CEO might prefer risky debt to
equity. While he may disagree with the market about the probability of bankruptcy and, thus,
view debt as too expensive, he retains more rights to the (perceived) upside with risky debt
than with equity. Thus, we predict that the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on acquisition decisions is
most pronounced in ﬁrms with large cash resources and untapped debt capacity.
To test this prediction, we employ the Kaplan-Zingales index. Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
use information from annual reports and company executives to measure ﬁnancing constraints
directly. They then estimate an ordered logit of this classiﬁcation on ﬁve accounting ratios
related to ﬁnancial constraints. These variables are cash ﬂow to total capital, Q, debt to total
capital, dividends to total capital, and cash holdings to capital. Recent research (Baker et al.
(2001), Lamont et al., (2001), Malmendier and Tate (2003)) uses the estimates to construct
an index of ﬁnancial constraints (or equity dependence) as follows:
KZit = −1.001909 ∗
CFit
Kit−1







Higher values of the linear combination of the ﬁve ratios implies a higher degree of equity
dependence27. Prediction 2 would be conﬁrmed if the eﬀect of overconﬁdence is strongest for
the subsample of ﬁrms that have the lowest values of the Kaplan-Zingales index.
We divide our sample into quintiles of the Kaplan-Zingales index and estimate random eﬀects
logit regressions of Equation (3) separately on each quintile.28 Since the capital structure of a
ﬁrm may change endogenously in anticipation of (or preparation for) a merger, we use the value
of the index at the beginning of the year preceding the merger. The results of our estimation
are in Table 9. In Panel A, the dependent variable indicates that the ﬁrm made at least one
successful bid in a particular ﬁrm year. We ﬁnd, as predicted, a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of overconﬁdence in the “least constrained” quintile (the odds ratio on overconﬁdence is 2.29)
and no signiﬁcant eﬀect in the “most constrained” quintile. The large diﬀerence is not due to
al a c ko fs u ﬃcient mergers to identify the eﬀect in the most constrained quintile: the number
of successful bids is virtually identical in the top and bottom quintiles (70 versus 66).
In Section D, we show that overconﬁdent managers are particularly prone to make diversifying
bids, which are, from an ex-ante perspective, less likely to generate future returns. Thus, the
22discrepancy in beliefs (between the market and an overconﬁdent CEO) about the proﬁtability
of a diversifying merger is likely to be particularly high. In other words, the undervaluation
eﬀect when making a diversifying bid is likely to be particularly acute because the contribution
of b e to b V (c) − V (c) will be particularly large. As a result, we expect to ﬁnd an even starker
demonstration of Prediction 2 when we limit our attention to diversifying mergers. The results
are in Panel B of Table 9. As in Panel A, we ﬁn das t r o n ga n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect of over-
conﬁdence among the least constrained managers (the odds ratio on overconﬁdence is 2.55)
and no signiﬁcant eﬀect among the most constrained managers. Notably, the eﬀect among
unconstrained managers is larger here than in Panel A. The eﬀect of overconﬁdence appears
to decline monotonically as we move progressively to more constrained quintiles of the index.
The data conﬁrms Prediction 2 of our model: the eﬀects of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness are
strongest for managers with abundant internal resources. This eﬀect is most pronounced when
we restrict attention to a class of value-destroying mergers most prevalent among overconﬁdent
managers. The data also conﬁrms the ﬁnancing implications of our model. We ﬁnd that
overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely, conditional on conducting a merger, to ﬁnance it using cash
and debt (Table 10). The eﬀect is strongest if we control for market over- and undervaluation.
In Panel C, we run a logit regression to estimate the probability of conducting a cash acquisition
conditional on overconﬁdence, stock and option ownership, size of the target as a fraction of the
acquiror’s value, and over- or undervaluation. We ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs are far more
likely than rational managers to conduct a cash acquisition when the eﬀects of undervaluation
are acute, as captured by Tobin’s Q being less than 1. Interestingly, CEOs do fewer cash
deals when they are overvalued by the market. These result conﬁrm both that overconﬁdent
managers are particularly sensitive to (perceived) market undervaluation and that investor
sentiment aﬀects merger ﬁnancing decisions, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2002).
FR o b u s t n e s s
We brieﬂy discuss the robustness of our results to changes in the empirical speciﬁcation. We
focus on the baseline estimates of Equation (3).
1. Is the Option in the Money? Our longholder measure of overconﬁdence is appealing in its
simplicity: we classify a CEO as overconﬁdent if he ever holds an option until expiration. Of
course, the less an option is in the money, the less delayed exercise indicates likely overcon-
23ﬁdence. As a robustness check of our measure, then, we require that the option that is held
u n t i le x p i r a t i o nb ea tl e a s tx% in the money at the beginning of its ﬁnal year. We vary x
between 0 and 100 by increments of 10.A sw ei n c r e a s ex,t h ec l a s s i ﬁcation as overconﬁdent
becomes more restrictive. At the same time, we hold the deﬁnition of “rational” option ex-
ercise behavior constant, i.e. we require that the CEO never holds an option until the ﬁnal
year. This restriction keeps the comparison group the same across all regressions.29 Figure
1p r e s e n t st h ec o e ﬃcients on these modiﬁed proxies for overconﬁdence in estimates of Equa-
tion (3). In the logit and random eﬀects logit speciﬁcations, the overconﬁdence coeﬃcient is
roughly constant as we vary x.I nt h eﬁxed eﬀects logit speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient appears to
modestly increase. We conclude that the eﬀect of longholder on acquisitiveness is not driven
by CEOs with out-of-the money options.
2. Consistency of behavior. Thus far, we have classiﬁed CEOs as overconﬁdent if they ever
held an option until expiration. A natural alternative is to require that they always hold their
option packages until expiration. Similarly, we can require the non-overconﬁdent CEOs to be
“habitual” early exercisers. Of course, the restrictions these tests impose on sample size are
severe. For example, when we require that an overconﬁdent CEO never exercises an entire
option package before expiration, we reduce our sample of overconﬁdent CEO years from 742
to 259. Or, comparing overconﬁdent CEOs to early exercisers decreases total ﬁrm years in
the regression from 3690 to 1181. Nevertheless, our results hold. When we require that CEOs
always hold options to expiration to be overconﬁdent, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant odds ratio of 1.81 on
overconﬁdence in the random eﬀects estimation of Equation (3). Similarly, when we compare
overconﬁdent CEOs, measured by longholder, only to CEOs who always exercise options while
they still have 6 or more years of remaining duration (the average remaining duration at
exercise is 5.2 years in our sample), we ﬁnd an odds ratio of 1.57 on longholder. Finally, if we
impose both restrictions, i.e. require that overconﬁdent CEOs always hold to expiration and
that rational CEOs always exercise early, we ﬁnd an odds ratio of 1.69 on overconﬁdence.
GO v e r c o n ﬁdence and the Press
So far, we have used CEOs’ personal portfolio decisions to identify diﬀerences in beliefs between
managers and outsiders about the ﬁrms’ future prospects. To conﬁrm that our measure is iden-
tifying overconﬁdent CEOs, we now construct an alternative measure. Rather than identifying
diﬀerences in beliefs from the managerial side, we identify them from the perspective of corpo-
24rate outsiders. In particular, we classify CEOs as overconﬁdent if the market perceives them
as “conﬁdent” and “optimistic.” Our proxy for market perception is press coverage in leading
business publications: The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Business Week, Finan-
cial Times, and The Economist. Using the press data described in Section II, we record the
number of articles from the Factiva.com and LexisNexis searches that refer to the CEO using
the terms (a)“ c o n ﬁdent” or “conﬁdence,” (b) “optimistic” or “optimism,” (c)“ n o tc o n ﬁdent,”
(d) “not optimistic,” and (e) “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” “frugal,” or
“steady.” We construct the alternative overconﬁdence measure by comparing the number of
articles that portray the CEO as conﬁdent and optimistic to the number of articles that por-
tray him as not conﬁdent, not optimistic, reliable, cautious, conservative, practical, frugal, or
steady. That is, we deﬁne the following indicator of overconﬁdence:
TOTALconfident=
(
1 if a + b>c+ d + e
0 otherwise
We choose a measure that removes coverage frequency for two reasons. First, conducting
mergers may lead to heightened press coverage. This eﬀect could ultimately trigger reverse
causality if total coverage creeps into our overconﬁdence measure. Second, some CEOs are
simply mentioned more often in the press than others, regardless of context. As a result, they
are more likely to be mentioned as “conﬁdent” or “optimistic.” A potential shortcoming of this
overconﬁdence measure is that managers might try to convey conﬁdence and optimism to the
press as a way to keep their share price high. It is unlikely that managers consistently follow
this strategy through their tenure since we would not expect them to be able to perpetually
fool the market. However, it is possible that CEOs try to convey (false) conﬁdence to the media
around large events, like merger announcements, that can have deleterious eﬀects on the share
price. In order for such “hyping” to be successful, the CEO would require a wide audience.
Thus, we can partially address this concern by controlling for the total number of articles
referring to the CEO. Further, Table 12 reports a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation
(ρ =0 .11,s i g n i ﬁcant at 1%) between TOTALconﬁdent and our longholder overconﬁdence
measure (which is not susceptible to this critique). Moreover, if we split the longholder variable
into “winners” and “losers” as in Section C, we ﬁnd that the “loser” portion is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with the press measure (ρ =0 .15), but the “winner” portion is not
(ρ = −0.01). If managerial hyping were the primary determinant of our press measure, we
might expect CEOs to personally proﬁt from portrayal as conﬁdent or optimistic. But, on
average, it appears that a 1 under the TOTALconﬁdent classiﬁcation is more associated with
25negative30 personal returns.31 And, TOTALconﬁdent picks up the component of longholder
most likely to represent overconﬁdence.
Our press measure of overconﬁdence not only positively correlates with the longholder measure
of overconﬁdence, but also performs remarkably similarly in the acquisitiveness regressions.32
First, we can replicate the overall acquisitiveness regressions of Table 4, using TOTALconﬁdent
as our proxy for O and the total number of mentions in the press as an additional control. In the
random eﬀects speciﬁcation, for example, we ﬁnd an odds ratio of 1.33,w h i c hi ss i g n i ﬁcant at
the 5% level. We can also replicate the test of Prediction 1 from Section D, using diversiﬁcation
as a proxy for negative expected value. Table 13 presents the results. TOTALconﬁdent, like
longholder, predicts a heightened probability of conducting a diversifying deal. The odds ratio
in the random eﬀects speciﬁcation is 1.78 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). And, as with longholder,
we ﬁnd that TOTALconﬁdent does not predict heightened acquisitiveness via within industry
deals. Here, the eﬀect of TOTALconﬁdent is virtually zero in all three speciﬁcations.
We also re-measure the eﬀect of overconﬁdence conditioning on internal resources (Prediction
2). As in Section E, we estimate Equation (3) separately on quintiles of the Kaplan-Zingales
index. We ﬁnd a strong positive impact of overconﬁdence on acquisitiveness in the least
constrained quintile and no signiﬁcant impact in the most constrained quintile. As with long-
holder, the eﬀect is most pronounced for “bad” (diversifying) acquisitions. The largest eﬀect,
a 2.90 odds ratio (signiﬁcant at 5%), occurs among the least constrained ﬁrms and there is an
insigniﬁcant 1.64 odds ratio among the most constrained ﬁrms.
Finally, we note that the TOTALconﬁdent measure of overconﬁdence not only predicts acquis-
itiveness, but also strongly predicts increased sensitivity of corporate investment to cash ﬂow,
particularly among the most equity dependent ﬁrms. Malmendier and Tate (2003) present
similar results for portfolio measures of overconﬁdence, including longholder. All results repli-
cate with the TOTALconﬁdent measure. This is a ﬁnal piece of evidence against the hyping
interpretation of the TOTALconﬁd e n tr e s u l t ss i n c et h eh y p i n ga r g u m e n ti sl e s sr e l e v a n tf o r
investment decisions. Investment is measured annually as the aggregate capital expenditure at
the end of the ﬁscal year. CEOs cannot consistently hype every element that goes into their
ﬁrms’ capex. Thus, the strong evidence that conﬁdence in the press correlates with investment
distortions further assuages our concern about this issue.33
These results bolster the overconﬁdence story in several ways. First, they provide an important
conﬁrmation that our personal portfolio approach indeed captures managerial overconﬁdence.
26Whether we measure diﬀerences in beliefs between the manager and the market using man-
agerial portfolio decisions or market perception, the results are the same. Second, our theory
assumes that outside ﬁnanciers are less optimistic about the ﬁrm’s future performance and will
not provide capital at the rates the CEO believes are appropriate. Our press results conﬁrm
that the market recognizes managerial overconﬁdence. Finally, the press results provide further
evidence that our overconﬁdence measures capture aspects of the CEOs’ personalities rather
than an omitted ﬁrm eﬀect. While we address this possibility for the portfolio measures using
controls and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the press measure provides direct evidence: the searches are for
executive personality features. Framed diﬀerently, the press results provide a crucial insight
into the type of executive captured by our portfolio measures of overconﬁdence.
IV Market Reaction to Overconﬁdence
Studying mergers and acquisitions provides the opportunity to identify the market’s reaction
to the announcement of the deal. Because many other corporate decisions, like investment,
must be studied in aggregate due to data limitations, we cannot deduce the reaction of the
market to any particular project. With mergers, we know the exact date of announcement.
This allows us to measure market response using daily stock returns.
Our theory predicts that the market will react more negatively to the announced bids of
overconﬁdent CEOs than to the bids of other CEOs (Prediction 3). The negative impact of
overconﬁdence reﬂects that overconﬁdent CEOs do some value-destroying mergers and that
they forego some value-creating ones when perceived ﬁnancing costs are too high. Further,
competition can induce overconﬁdent CEOs to overpay for their mergers.
We apply event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985, and MacKinlay, 1997)
to measure the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on announcement returns. The event window is the
three days surrounding the announcement of the bid, starting at day −1 and ending on day
+1 where day 0 is the day of the announcement.34 We calculate the cumulative abnormal
return to the acquiring ﬁrm’s stock over this window. Following Fuller et al., (2002), we use
market returns as our proxy for expected returns. This approach is appropriate since our
sample consists of large U.S. companies that compose a substantial portion of market returns.
Moreover, we avoid having to drop overlapping events (as is common in alternative event study
methodologies using estimation periods). In fact, rapid succession of multiple acquisitions may
27indicate a particularly high level of overconﬁdence. Since merging companies is often highly
disruptive — labor forces must be consolidated, corporate cultures must be adapted, etc. — it
may be the height of hubris to juggle several such projects at once.35 So, assuming that α =0
and β =1for the ﬁrms in our sample, abnormal returns are given by
ARit = rit − rm
t
where rit is ﬁrm i’s return on day t of the event window and rm
t is the return on the S&P 500





To test whether overconﬁdence has a negative contribution to the mean cumulative abnormal
return during the event window, we run the following cross-sectional regression:
(4) CARi = γ1 + γ2Oi + X0
iG + εi
where O indicates an overconﬁdent manager and X is the set of controls. The null hypothesis
is γ2 < 0. Table 14 presents the results. We estimate ﬁve speciﬁcations of the regression. First,
we include only stock ownership and vested options in our set of controls, X.36 Second, we add
an indicator of relatedness (equal to 1 if the acquiror and target share a Fama-French industry
group), an indicator of corporate governance (eﬃcient board size), and an indicator of cash
ﬁnanced deals as additional controls. Third, we add controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects. Fourth,
we add controls for industry ﬁxed eﬀects (measured using Fama-French industry groups) and
their interaction with the year eﬀects. And, ﬁfth, we add age and an indicator of whether the
CEO is also chairman of the board and president to the analysis.
The corporate governance control has the expected eﬀect: good corporate governance is asso-
ciated with higher cumulative abnormal returns. The same is true for high managerial stock
ownership and vested option holdings (at least until they reach extreme levels). The market
views related mergers and cash ﬁnanced deals more favorably, although the eﬀect of relatedness
is often just under conventional signiﬁcance levels. Interestingly, the market discounts deals
of older CEOs by 5 basis points per additional year. Most importantly, overconﬁdence has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on cumulative abnormal returns across speciﬁcations. The market
discounts overconﬁdent bids by 60 to 100 basis points over the three day window relative to
the average merger of a non-overconﬁdent CEO.37 Given a baseline negative announcement
eﬀect of 50 basis points, the additional discount for mergers of overconﬁdent CEOs is large.
28VC o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we establish the eﬀect of overconﬁdence on managerial
acquisitiveness and, second, we explore the market’s response. We develop a simple model of
the acquisition decision of an overconﬁdent CEO. The model shows that overconﬁdent CEOs
are more eager to make acquisitions, but that perceived ﬁnancing constraints can prevent
them from doing so. Overconﬁdent CEOs are unambiguously more likely than rational CEOs
to undertake value-destroying acquisitions. And they are more likely to make acquisitions when
their ﬁrm has abundant internal resources. Because they do lower quality deals, on average,
and tend to overpay, the market discounts their acquisitions relative to other CEOs.
We test these predictions using data on a sample of Forbes 500 ﬁrms. We ﬁnd strong evidence in
support of the overconﬁdence hypothesis. Overconﬁdence positively impacts the acquisitiveness
of CEOs over our entire sample of ﬁrm years. That is, overconﬁdence boosts the number of
takeovers on average, despite the mitigating impact of cash constraints. Further, as predicted
by our theory, overconﬁdent CEOs undertake more diversifying mergers, which are unlikely to
create value. In addition, overconﬁdence has a strong positive impact on the probability of
conducting mergers (and particularly of diversifying mergers) among the least equity dependent
ﬁrms and no eﬀect among the most equity dependent ﬁrms. These results hold using both
option exercise and press coverage to measure overconﬁdence. Finally, the market prefers the
bids of rational managers: cumulative abnormal returns around overconﬁdent bids are roughly
100 basis points lower on average than for rational bids.
Our results have important implications for contracting practices and organizational design.
Overconﬁdence provides an alternative explanation for certain agency problems in ﬁrms and for
the origin of private beneﬁts. Indeed, overconﬁdence may be a more attractive assumption than
empire-building preferences, under which CEOs are perpetually and consciously disregarding
the interests of the shareholders. Because overconﬁdent CEOs believe they are maximizing
value, standard incentives are unlikely to correct their suboptimal decisions. However, over-
conﬁdent CEOs do respond to ﬁnancing constraints. Thus, overconﬁdence further motivates
the constraining role of capital structure In addition, independent directors may need to play
a more active role in project assessment and selection to counterbalance CEO overconﬁdence.
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9We follow the literature on self-serving attribution and on the “illusion of control” and assign the labels
“overconﬁdence” to the overestimation of one’s own abilities (such as IQ or driving skill; see Feather and Simon
1971, Langer 1975) and “overoptimism” to the overestimation of exogenous outcomes (such as the outbreak of
a war, see Milburn 1978, Hey 1984, and Bazerman 2002).
10Variation in bargaining power, coupled with overconﬁdence, can give rise to over-payment. Over-payment
arises endogenously in a multi-bidder framework, see Subsection D.
11As noted above, risky debt has similar properties: mangers view the demanded interest rate as too high.
3612More generally, the perceived synergies e e might depend on the outﬂow of cash c. In particular, allowing e e
to decrease with c is a way to capture the dynamic eﬀects of cash constraints (perceived undervaluation) on an
overconﬁdent CEO’s future merger and investment decisions. As long as e e(·) > 0, the results of the section go
through.
13We ignore the knife-edge case of a tie.
14Another potential use of internal resources is to repurchase shares the overconﬁd e n tC E Op e r c e i v e st ob e
undervalued. However, since any gain to remaining shareholders by repurchasing undervalued shares must be
oﬀset by a loss to the former shareholders, a CEO who maximizes current shareholder value will not undertake
such a transaction.
15Few of our 477 sample ﬁrms are targets; fewer are acquired by another sample ﬁrm.
16This selection criterion is especially important here since we merge data from the SDC database with the
CRSP merger data. Acquisitions of small units of another company diﬀer substantially from the acquisition of
large NYSE ﬁrms and may not require the direct involvement of the acquiring company’s CEO.
17Deﬁnitions as in Fama and French (2002).
18Wherever econometrically possible, we conﬁrmed the robustness of the estimates to the assumption that G
is normal.
19The corporate governance literature suggests that an eﬀe c t i v eb o a r ds h o u l dh a v en om o r et h a n1 2m e m b e r s .
The results are robust to the using the logarithm of board size or the number (or percentage) of CEOs of other
companies sitting on the board as alternative measures of governance.
20This eﬀect appears to be non-monotonic. For example, we ﬁnd a positive and marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient when we include a dummy variable for “high Tobin’s Q.” (Q>1) Alternatively, including the square of
Tobin’s Q reverses the direction of the level eﬀect (though it remains insigniﬁcant).
21Here standard errors are adjusted for clustering within industry, rather than ﬁrm.
22In the ﬁxed eﬀects (or conditional) logit speciﬁcation, standard errors are not robust to clustering at the
ﬁrm level. However, in a traditional logit speciﬁcation with ﬁrm dummies, the errors with ﬁrm-level clustering
are actually slightly smaller than the errors from the conditional logit speciﬁcation.
23If we look beyond the last 5 years before expiration, we risk entering the vesting period (during which the
CEO could not have exercised the option).
24Note that this test also assuages reverse causality and endogeneity concerns.
25We also increase the threshold for inclusion in the proﬁts calculation by 0.05 per year to account for the
increase in the Hall-Murphy threshold as remaining duration on the option increases.
26Further suggestive evidence comes from Lys and Vincent (1995) and Shefrin (2000), who chronicle AT&T’s
1990 acquisition of NCR using exactly this paradigm. Reassuringly, the longholder measure identiﬁes AT&T’s
37CEO (Robert Allen) as overconﬁdent.
27For this test, we use the deﬁnition of Q employed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to avoid rendering the
weights meaningless. The COMPUSTAT data items are: cash ﬂow to capital = (item 18 + item 14) / item 8 ;
Q = [item 6 + (item24 * item 25) - item 60 - item 74] / item 6 ; debt to capital (leverage) = (item 9 + item
34) / (item 9 + item 34 + item 216) ; dividends to capital = item21 + item 19) / item 8 ; cash to capital =
item 1 / item 8. Item 8, capital, is always taken at the beginning of the year (lagged).
28The eﬀects of a simple logit are similar. Fixed eﬀects logit is not feasible since quintiling the sample leaves
us with too few identiﬁable cases in some subsamples.
29The results are similar if we instead group longholders who do not meet the more stringent requirements
together with the “rational” CEOs.
30Negative here means relative to the S&P 500 and not necessarily < 0.
31In addition, we do not ﬁnd a positive impact on the announcement eﬀect around merger announcements for
TOTALconﬁdent CEOs, again suggesting that the incentive to hype projects in the press may not be very strong
(on average). This interpretation (and the intepretation of the personal returns from holding options) comes
with the caveat that we cannot observe how the market would have reacted to these merger announcements (or
ﬁrm performance in general) if the same CEOs had not been portrayed as optimistic or conﬁdent in the press.
32For the sake of brevity, we only tabulate selected results.
33While total press coverage has strong positive predictive power for acquisitions, it has none for investment
cash ﬂow sensitivity. This conﬁrms that hyping is more important for merger projects than investment, but
also suggests that it is not driving our results.
34While the three-day window minimizes the eﬀect of any noise in our proxy for expected returns, we ﬁnd
similar results using a window of ﬁve days (−2 to +2).
35Nevertheless, the market-model results are almost identical.
36For these regressions, we omit the 7 observations in the upper 1% tail of vested options. These CEOs
have holdings (as a fraction of shares outstanding) as high as 0.32 (the mean holding is 0.0034 with a standard
deviation of 0.014). Including these observations destroys the strong positive relationship between vested options
and CAR. As a result, our overconﬁdence proxy must capture this relationship (recall the positive correlation
between longholder and vested options), mitigating somewhat the estimated coeﬃcient. The results are similar
if, instead, we winsorize option holdings.
37The results are slightly stronger when we estimate this diﬀerence in market reaction only using overconﬁdent
















Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Median
3,689 57.53 58 742 57.01 57
3,664 8.51 6 719 9.99 8
3,690 0.38 0 742 0.38 0
3,143 0.17 0 652 0.14 0
3,690 2.30 0.12 742 1.81 0.24
3,690 0.02 0.00 742 0.06 0.02
2,164 0.34 0 478 0.39 0 0.49
2,164 0.55 1 478 0.53 1
Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
3,669 92.19 39 178.62 0 2,447
3,669 0.82 0 1.95 0 25
3,669 0.73 0 1.74 0 20
3,669 0.02 0 0.20 0 3
3,669 0.06 0 0.29 0 3











Number of firms = 327. Financial variables are reported in $ millions. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation. Stock
ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the
beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable
where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between four and twelve members. Assets, capital, and Q are at the beginning of the fiscal year; all other variables are at the end.
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Firm Data 
Standard 















"Reliable, Cautious, Conservative, Practical, Steady, Frugal" Mentions
Number of Firms = 327; Number of CEOs = 661






Full Sample: Number of CEOs=661















Cash Flow normalized by lagged capital (CF/k)


















Technical Education is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has "technical education," i.e. an undergraduate or graduate degree in engineering, physics, operations research, chemistry, mathematics, biology,
pharmacy, and other applied sciences.  Press data comes from Business Week , The New York Times , Financial Times , The Economist  and The Wall Street Journal  using LexisNexis  and Factiva.com .
















Number of Mergers with 
Disclosed Method of Payment
US US US
1980 23 7 30% 48% 9 39% 31% 7 30% 21%
1981 42 5 12% 43% 22 52% 34% 15 36% 23%
1982 46 8 17% 40% 23 50% 29% 15 33% 31%
1983 52 11 21% 32% 21 40% 35% 20 38% 33%
1984 53 22 42% 44% 12 23% 26% 19 36% 30%
1985 70 41 59% 51% 15 21% 23% 14 20% 26%
1986 90 57 63% 42% 23 26% 32% 10 11% 26%
1987 71 34 48% 42% 28 39% 34% 9 13% 24%
1988 62 48 77% 57% 7 11% 2% 7 11% 22%
1989 68 34 50% 47% 24 35% 30% 10 15% 23%
1990 27 12 44% 41% 11 41% 31% 4 15% 28%
1991 49 21 43% 35% 20 41% 34% 8 16% 31%
1992 46 16 35% 23% 22 48% 40% 8 17% 37%
1993 56 19 34% 25% 28 50% 40% 9 16% 35%
1994 50 26 52% 27% 15 30% 39% 9 18% 34%
Total 805 361 45% 280 35% 164 20%




Acquiror in Service Industry















Acquiror in Transportation Industry
Acquiror in Trade Industry





Relatedness is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the acquiror and target share a Fama-French 48 industry group. Cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiror are calculated for an
event window of -1 to +1 using a modified market model. The modified market model takes the daily S&P 500 return as the expected return in computing abnormal returns. Industry variables
are defined on Table 1. The sample consists of 869 completed mergers.
Panel B.  Merger Financing: Summary Statistics
Cash and Debt
0.497
Acquiror in Technical Industry









Q 0.09 -0.31 1.00
Cash Flow 0.13 -0.25 0.46 1.00
Stock Ownership -0.03 -0.19 0.11 0.16 1.00
Vested Options 0.18 -0.18 0.09 0.18 0.10 1.00
Corporate Governance 0.04 -0.37 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.08 1.00
Longholder Age




President and Chairman 0.00 -0.03 1.00
Tenure 0.10 0.39 0.01 1.00
Longholder Fin. Ed. Tech. Ed.
Longholder 1.00
Finance Education 0.06 1.00
Technical Education -0.02 -0.09 1.00
Panel C. Correlations with CEO Characteristics (II): Educational Background (N=2164)
Table 3. Correlations with Overconfidence Measure
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before
expiration. Size is the log of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets at the beginning of the
year. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock ownership is
the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of
options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied
by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of
directors has between four and twelve members.  
Panel A. Correlations with Firm Characterisitcs (N=3690)
Panel B. Correlations with CEO Characteristics (I) (N=3663)
Technical Education is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has "technical education," i.e. an undergraduate or graduate degree in engineering,  





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.9046 0.8733 0.8683 0.8600 0.6234
(1.80)* (1.95)* (1.60) (2.05)** (2.60)***
Qt-1 0.7719 0.7296 0.6651 0.7316 0.8291
(2.85)*** (2.97)*** (2.37)** (2.70)*** (1.11)
Cash Flow 1.9631 2.0534 2.1712 2.1816 2.6724
(3.75)*** (3.93)*** (2.35)** (3.68)*** (2.70)***
Stock Ownership 1.1212 1.2905 0.4126 1.3482 0.8208
(0.13) (0.30) (0.67) (0.28) (0.11)
Vested Options 1.5912 1.5059 1.9596 0.9217 0.2802
(2.56)** (1.96)* (1.46) (0.19) (2.36)**
Corporate Governance 0.6697 0.6556 0.6125 0.7192 1.0428
(3.02)*** (3.08)*** (2.89)*** (2.17)** (0.21)
Longholder 1.6831 1.5904 1.5557 1.5423 1.7006 2.5303
(2.98)*** (2.72)*** (2.58)*** (1.90)* (3.09)*** (2.67)***
Industry Fixed Effects no no no yes no no
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Industry*Year Effects no no no yes no no
Observations 3690 3690 3690 2192 3690 2261
Number of Firms 327 184
Table 4. Do Overconfident CEOs Complete More Mergers?
Robust z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one merger bid that was eventually successful in a particular firm
year. Size is the log of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock ownership is the fraction of company
stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are
exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that
the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors has
between four and twelve members.  
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before
expiration. The fixed effects logit model is estimated consistently using a conditional logit specification. Standard errors in columns 1-3 are
robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-firm serial correlation. Standard errors in column 4 are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
within-industry correlation, where industries are measured using the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997). Coefficients are presented as
odds ratios. (1) (2) (3)
Size 0.8599 0.8600 0.8600
(2.05)** (2.05)** (2.05)**
Qt-1 0.7303 0.7313 0.7317
(2.71)*** (2.70)*** (2.69)***
Cash Flow 2.1713 2.1767 2.1827
(3.65)*** (3.66)*** (3.67)***
Stock Ownership 1.3454 1.3465 1.3486
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Vested Options 0.9108 0.9189 0.9223
(0.22) (0.20) (0.19)
Corporate Governance 0.7189 0.7192 0.7192
(2.17)** (2.17)** (2.17)**
3 Final Years of a Longheld Option 1.5399
(1.86)*
4 Final Years of a Longheld Option 1.6626
(2.41)**
5 Final Years of a Longheld Option 1.7072
(2.68)***
Remaining Longholder CEO years 1.8045 1.7371 1.6916
(3.04)*** (2.68)*** (2.39)**
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Observations 3690 3690 3690
Number of Firms 327 327 327
Table 5. Timing of Mergers and Inside Information
z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All firm years included. The dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one merger bid that was eventually
successful in a particular firm year. Size is the log of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value
of assets. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock
ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the
CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding.
Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable
where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between four and twelve members. 
'x' Final Years of a Longheld Option is a binary variable where 1 signifies the last 'x' years of the duration of one of the longholder CEO's
longheld options. Remaining longholder CEO years are the years of a longholder CEO's tenure that do not fall in the 'x' final years of a


















Size 0.8721 0.8598 0.6251
(1.93)* (1.99)** (2.46)**
Qt-1 0.7259 0.7347 0.8806
(2.86)*** (2.54)** (0.74)
Cash Flow 2.0042 2.1030 2.8787
(3.49)*** (3.22)*** (2.64)***
Stock Ownership 1.5555 1.5853 0.7498
(0.51) (0.42) (0.15)
Vested Options 2.8574 1.7361 0.4921
(1.36) (0.53) (0.51)
Corporate Governance 0.6220 0.6823 1.0343
(3.31)*** (2.45)** (0.16)
Longholder: Did OK 1.2015 1.2082 1.1555
(0.74) (0.80) (0.27)
Longholder: Should Have Exercised 1.8277 1.9591 4.4648
(1.95)* (2.32)** (2.32)**
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Observations 3532 3532 2111
Number of Firms 318 172
0.27
Panel A. Returns
For each option that is held until expiration and that is at least 40% in the money at the beginning of its final year, we calculate the return the
CEO would have gotten from instead exercising the option a year sooner and investing in the S&P 500. We assume exercise both in the final year













Robust z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel B. Do "Mistaken" Holders Drive the Acquisitiveness Result?
The dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one merger bid that was eventually successful in a particular firm
year. Size is the log of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock ownership is the fraction of
company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that
are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so
that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors
has between four and twelve members.  
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before
expiration. Longholder: Did OK is 1 for CEOs for whom Longholder is 1 and who did better by holding at least as many times as they would
have done better by exercising longheld options a year earlier. Longholder: Should Have Exercised is 1 for CEOs for whom Longholder is 1 and
who would have done better by exercising a year earlier more times than they did better by holding. The fixed effects logit model is estimated
consistently using a conditional logit specification. Standard errors in column 1 are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-firm serial
correlation. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Longholders whose longheld options were not at least 40% in the money at the beginning






Size 0.9125 0.9047 0.5940
(1.31)* (1.36) (2.65)***
Qt-1 0.7234 0.7302 0.8434
(2.63)*** (2.38)** (0.85)
Cash Flow 1.7670 1.8825 2.0624
(2.83)*** (2.79)*** (2.27)**
Stock Ownership 0.6436 0.7004 0.5843
(0.49) (0.29) (0.21)
Vested Options 3.8995 2.4668 0.2675
(2.16)** (1.09) (1.06)
Corporate Governance 0.6494 0.7049 1.0718
(3.04)*** (2.29)** (0.34)
Returnst-1 1.4801 1.4467 1.1424
(1.61) (1.62) (0.54)
Returnst-2 1.2539 1.2391 1.0474
(1.15) (1.01) (0.20)
Returnst-3 1.0635 1.0405 0.9262
(0.31) (0.19) (0.35)
Returnst-4 1.3548 1.3452 1.2513
(1.40) (1.37) (0.98)
Returnst-5 1.2334 1.2202 1.1539
(1.03) (0.95) (0.66)
Longholder 1.5048 1.6184 2.4628
(2.33)** (2.83)*** (2.56)**
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Observations 3479 3479 2157
Number of Firms 305 173
Robust z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Control for Returns
The dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one merger bid that was eventually successful in a particular
firm year. Size is the log of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock ownership is the
fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings
of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are
multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies
that the board of directors has between four and twelve members. Returns are the natural logarithm of 1 plus the annual return on company
equity. 
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year
before expiration. The fixed effects logit model is estimated consistently using a conditional logit specification. Standard errors in column 1









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 1.0153 1.0227 0.8466 0.6915 0.6555 0.3879
(0.20) (0.25) (0.70) (3.73)*** (3.75)*** (3.43)***
Qt-1 0.7341 0.7293 0.8643 0.6998 0.7097 0.7516
(2.33)** (2.00)** (0.59) (2.39)** (2.13)** (1.15)
Cash Flow 1.9730 2.2331 3.1159 2.1259 2.0717 2.7895
(3.03)*** (3.10)*** (2.65)*** (3.17)*** (2.40)** (1.80)*
Stock Ownership 2.4749 2.1750 0.1895 0.6328 0.7951 2.5200
(0.84) (0.58) (0.64) (0.34) (0.15) (0.37)
Vested Options 1.6428 1.2012 0.5975 0.8585 0.5298 0.1630
(3.31)*** (0.41) (0.94) (0.61) (1.06) (2.00)**
Corporate Governance 0.5342 0.5726 0.8255 0.8411 0.9331 1.3414
(3.49)*** (2.90)*** (0.74) (0.85) (0.31) (1.03)
Longholder 1.6008 1.7763 3.1494 1.3762 1.4498 1.5067
(2.40)** (2.70)*** (2.59)*** (1.36) (1.47) (0.75)
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3690 3690 1577 3690 3690 1227
Number of Firms 327 128 327 100
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable in panel 1 is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made a diversifying merger bid that was eventually successful in a
particular firm year. The dependent variable in panel 2 is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made a within-industry merger bid that was
eventually successful in a particular firm year. Industries are the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997). Size is the log of assets at the
beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus
depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Stock ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and
his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the
beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to
stock ownership.  Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between four and twelve members. 
Table 8. Diversifying and Same-Industry Mergers
Panel 1.  Diversifying Mergers Panel 2.  Within Industry Mergers
Robust z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before
expiration. The fixed effects logit model is estimated consistently using a conditional logit specification. Standard errors in columns 1 and 4 are




























Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Size 0.8516 1.2721 0.8755 0.7721 0.8669 1.1788 1.4193 0.9989 0.9243 1.0159
(1.15) (1.66)* (0.78) (1.34) (0.88) (0.84) (2.06)** (0.01) (0.29) (0.07)
Qt-1 0.5255 1.1147 0.6670 0.6790 0.5420 0.6203 1.2163 0.4624 0.8078 0.2205
(2.66)*** (0.50) (1.45) (0.91) (1.54) (1.49) (0.63) (1.71)* (0.39) (2.17)**
Cash Flow 1.3135 3.0960 11.4727 7.2486 6.3325 0.8742 5.2611 17.3604 11.2920 25.8691
(0.75) (1.90)* (3.27)*** (1.78)* (2.54)** (0.24) (2.22)** (3.49)*** (1.60) (3.29)***
Stock Ownership 0.0976 0.0000 7.8124 0.0546 2.3618 7.8331 0.0000 42.4903 0.1995 1.0701
(0.79) (1.83)* (0.85) (0.68) (0.62) (0.63) (1.65)* (1.50) (0.28) (0.03)
Vested Options 1.1400 83.7247 1.6643 70.1940 2.3858 0.8060 0.0003 2.9815 20953.4373 8.7639
(0.20) (1.76)* (0.51) (1.54) (0.55) (0.19) (1.17) (0.81) (2.60)*** (1.05)
Corporate Governance 0.7322 0.8544 0.5226 0.6143 0.8863 0.6021 0.9693 0.2216 0.4310 0.9572
(0.91) (0.48) (1.78)* (1.41) (0.37) (1.08) (0.08) (3.43)*** (1.69)* (0.10)
Longholder 2.2861 1.6792 1.7756 1.9533 0.8858 2.5462 1.8852 1.7297 1.0075 1.0865
(2.46)** (1.48) (1.54) (1.50) (0.33) (1.89)* (1.51) (1.36) (0.01) (0.18)
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 718 719 719 719 718 718 719 719 719 718
Number of Firms 125 156 168 165 152 125 156 168 165 152
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. All Mergers Panel B.  Diversifying Mergers
The dependent variable in panel 1 is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one merger bid that was eventually successful in a particular firm year. The dependent variable in panel 2 is binary
where 1 signifies that the firm made at least one diversifying merger bid that was eventually successful in a particular firm year. Industries are the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997). Size is the log
of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by capital at the
beginning of the year. Stock ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are
exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership.
Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between four and twelve members. 
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration. The sample is split into quintiles using values of the
Kaplan-Zingales index at the beginning of the prior year.  All regressions are logit with random effects.  Coefficients are presented as odds ratios.
Table 9. Overconfidence and Acquisitivenss by Equity Dependence
---------------------------------> --------------------------------->











CEOs 46.95% 36.15% 16.90% 1.30 0.88 1.01 1.12
Non-
overconfident 












CEOs 45.59% 41.18% 13.24% 1.11 0.84 1.12 1.55
Non-
overconfident 




















Panel A. All Mergers with Disclosed Method of Payment
Panel B. Mergers where Target Value is at Least 25% of Acquiror Value






* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
no
Robust z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
Observations
Sample includes all merger bids that were eventually successful. The dependent variable is binary where 1 signifies that the bid was
financed using only cash and debt. Undervalued is a binary variable where 1 indicates that Q at the beginning of the year was less
than or equal to 1. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Stock ownership is the fraction of company stock
owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are
exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied
by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Merger size is the amount the acquiror paid for the target as a
fraction of acquiror value (for SDC mergers, amount paid is the value of the transaction; for CRSP mergers, it is the market value of









Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last
year before expiration. UV * Longholder is the interaction of those two variables. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity






(1.31)% in money observations odds ratio p-value observations odds ratio p-value observations odds ratio p-value
0 3690 1.49 0.03 3613 1.65 0.01 2191 2.26 0.02
10 3613 1.53 0.02 3613 1.65 0.01 2191 2.26 0.02
20 3603 1.50 0.03 3603 1.61 0.01 2171 2.15 0.04
30 3581 1.40 0.08 3581 1.47 0.04 2142 1.94 0.08
40 3567 1.44 0.06 3567 1.51 0.03 2135 1.94 0.08
50 3558 1.39 0.10 3558 1.46 0.05 2126 1.99 0.07
60 3551 1.41 0.09 3551 1.49 0.04 2119 2.21 0.05
70 3534 1.43 0.08 3534 1.53 0.03 2108 2.63 0.03
80 3534 1.43 0.08 3534 1.53 0.03 2108 2.63 0.03
90 3531 1.43 0.08 3531 1.54 0.03 2105 2.78 0.02
100 3510 1.48 0.06 3510 1.59 0.02 2090 2.79 0.02
Table 11.  Overconfidence and Completed Mergers for Different % in the Money
Percentage in the money calculated at the beginning of the last year of duration. To keep the same comparison group across regressions (and limit attenuation for high % in the
money), we omit observations where a CEO goes from overconfident to not overconfident as we increase the required % in the money to be overconfident. Regressions are
specified as in Columns 3, 5, and 6 of Table 4.
Random Effects logit Fixed Effects logit logit
























































Size 0.13 0.31 1.00
Q 0.04 0.03 -0.31 1.00
Cash Flow 0.00 0.14 -0.25 0.46 1.00
CEO Ownership 0.04 0.17 -0.19 0.11 0.16 1.00
CEO Vested Options 0.05 0.04 -0.18 0.09 0.18 0.10 1.00









Age -0.11 0.03 1.00
President and Chairman 0.03 0.00 -0.03 1.00











Finance Education 0.11 -0.04 1.00
Technical Education -0.05 0.05 -0.09 1.00
Panel A. Press Confidence Measures with Longholder. (N = 3448)
Panel D. Press Confidence Measures with CEO Education. (N = 2110)
TOTALconfident is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the number of "confident" and "optimistic" mentions in the LexisNexis and Factiva.com searches
exceeds the number of "not confident", "not optimistic", and "reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, frugal" mentions. TOTALmentions is the
total number of articles mentioning the CEO in the two search sets. Size is the natural logarithm of assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value
of assets over the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and is normalized by
capital at the beginning of the year. CEO ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the
year. CEO vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common
shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is the number of
directors who currently serve as CEOs of other companies. 
Table 12.
Panel B. Correlations of Press Coverage with Firm Characteristics. (N = 3448)
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration.
Technical Education is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has "technical education," i.e. an undergraduate or graduate degree in engineering, physics,
operations research, chemistry, mathematics, biology, pharmacy, and other applied sciences.









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.9270 0.9385 0.8585 0.6044 0.5605 0.3788
(0.88) (0.66) (0.64) (4.88)*** (4.74)*** (3.53)***
Qt-1 0.7185 0.7126 0.8728 0.6842 0.6852 0.7563
(2.56)** (2.20)** (0.56) (2.54)** (2.36)** (1.13)
Cash Flow 1.9805 2.2542 3.3917 1.9001 1.9073 2.8360
(2.92)*** (3.14)*** (2.80)*** (2.55)** (2.12)** (1.85)*
CEO ownership [in %] 1.0711 1.0020 0.5056 0.1814 0.1103 0.1693
(0.06) (0.00) (0.26) (1.42) (1.32) (0.55)
CEO vested options  1.6016 1.2355 0.5813 0.8717 0.5415 0.1773
(3.30)*** (0.48) (1.01) (0.53) (1.01) (1.80)*
Corporate Governance 0.5633 0.5904 0.8135 0.8470 0.9292 1.3037
(3.14)*** (2.75)*** (0.79) (0.81) (0.33) (0.93)
TOTALmentions 1.0005 1.0005 0.9995 1.0014 1.0019 1.0094
(2.07)** (1.18) (0.55) (5.69)*** (3.44)*** (2.03)**
TOTALconfident 1.6971 1.7826 1.5077 1.0424 1.0368 0.8856
(2.95)*** (3.21)*** (1.48) (0.20) (0.16) (0.31)
Observations 3647 3647 1559 3647 3647 1226
Number of Firms 326 128 326 100
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 13. Press Coverage and Diversifying and Same-Industry Mergers
The dependent variable in panel 1 is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made a diversifying merger bid that was eventually successful in a
particular firm year. The dependent variable in panel 2 is binary where 1 signifies that the firm made a within-industry merger bid that was
eventually successful in a particular firm year. Industries are the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997). Size is the log of assets at the
beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus
depreciation and is normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. CEO ownership is the fraction of company stock owned by the CEO
and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. CEO vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6
months of the beginning of the year, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is
roughly comparable to stock ownership. Corporate governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between
four and twelve members.
TOTALconfident is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the number of "confident" and "optimistic" mentions in the LexisNexis and Wall Street
Journal searches exceeds the number of "not confident", "not optimistic", and "reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, frugal"
mentions. TOTAL mentions is the total number of articles mentioning the CEO in both sets of searches. The fixed effects logit model is
estimated consistently using a conditional logit specification. Standard errors in columns 1 and 4 are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
within-firm serial correlation.  All regressions include year fixed effects.  Coefficients are presented as odds ratios.
z statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
Panel 1.  Diversifying Mergers Panel 2.  Within Industry MergersOLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock Ownership 0.0703 0.0331 0.0362 0.1113 0.0291
(2.15)** (0.82) (0.86) (1.68)* (0.68)
CEO Vested Options 0.1415 0.1360 0.1416 -0.0517 0.1505
(2.43)** (2.34)** (2.41)** (0.80) (2.49)**
Relatedness 0.0045 0.0048 0.0062 0.0043
(1.29) (1.37) (1.24) (1.24)
Corporate Governance 0.0071 0.0079 0.0036 0.0073
(1.96)* (2.18)** (0.64) (1.98)**
Cash Financing 0.0121 0.014 0.0127 0.0145





Longholder -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0099 -0.0079
(1.73)* (1.79)* (1.81)* (2.33)** (2.00)**
Industry Fixed Effects no no no yes no
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes
Industry*Year Effects no no no yes no
Observations 759 687 687 687 687
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.58 0.10
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  Constant included.
Table 14. How Does the Market Respond to Overconfident CEOs' Mergers?
Vested options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year of the
bid, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Vested options are multiplied by 10 so that the mean is roughly
comparable to stock ownership. Relatedness is 1 for acquisitions in which the bidder and target firms are in the same
industry. Industries are the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997). Cash financing is a binary variable where 1
indicates that the acquisition was financed using some combination of cash and debt.  
The event window is the day before through the day after the announcement of the (eventually successful) bid. The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return on the bidder's stock from the day before the announcement of the
bid through the day after. Abnormal returns are calculated by taking the daily return on the bidder's common equity and
subtracting expected returns. Expected returns are the daily return on the S&P 500 index. Stock ownership is the fraction
of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year in which the bid occurs.  
Boss is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO is also the president and chairman of the board. Corporate
governance is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the board of directors has between four and twelve members.
Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option until the
last year before expiration. Standard errors in columns 1-3 and 5 are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-
firm correlation. Standard errors in column 4 are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-industry correlation,
where industries are measured using the 48 Fama and French industry groups (1997).